The Reign of Spain

Spain's Western allies, meanwhile, responded with a subtlety verging on agnosticism. The European Union countries, under Denmark's leadership, sought to issue a statement backing Spain's right to defend itself, but they were blocked by France. After Spain's recovery of Perejil, European Commission president Prodi said, "We continue to be worried by the events on the island"--as if the situation had been exacerbated rather than resolved. Prodi did not refer at all to the original Moroccan landing--an omission that rendered the Commission's statement even weaker than the one Kofi Annan issued from the United Nations (Annan condemned "all unilateral actions adopted up to this moment"). By Friday, July 19, the U.S. State Department was the key go-between. It sounded a decidedly French note, describing the standoff as an "unfortunate situation that involved two nations that are the United States' friends." Colin Powell said that any troops that remained on the island "would only make negotiations more difficult." El Pais, flagship paper of Spain's left intelligentsia, warned that taking back the island would start a whole new round of troubles. The Financial Times, while calling Morocco's invasion "ill-advised," called Spain's an "act of
folly."

Did they have a point? It depends how you look at it. Spain's insistence on continuing to claim a tiny chunk of Africa may weaken its position in negotiations over the British possession of Gibraltar, which abuts its territory. But Spain also would have run a big risk by doing nothing. Fernando Arias Salgado, Spain's ambassador to Morocco, worried that Morocco was releasing a trial balloon, hoping to threaten Spain's two large African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. He was right. Benaissa upped the ante in a press conference in Paris on Friday, warning that negotiations should begin on the status of Melilla; and Moroccan soldiers have taken to blocking pedestrian (but not tourist) access to Ceuta, whose economy depends on Moroccan shoppers.

MOROCCO is one of the more trustworthy nations in the Islamic world. That's not saying much, but the country does have a large, educated middle class and a semi-free press. France has deep economic ties with it. Spain rerouted an energy pipeline from Algeria through Morocco out of neighborly spirit not long ago (and has disavowed any intention of now seeking economic sanctions against Morocco). The Bush administration is interested in negotiating a far-ranging free-trade treaty with Morocco, of the sort negotiated with Chile after NAFTA. Most important, Morocco is cooperating in the war against al Qaeda. Perhaps because of this, Mohamed VI and his government believe they can get away with trying to shake concessions loose from the West.

The recapture of Perejil was a Spanish mission; the country sought no help or endorsement either from NATO or from any of its allies. This was exactly the sort of unilateral mission that "Europe," when regarding the United States, professes to deplore. But it has been met with unconditional support from NATO and widespread approval within Spain. As such, this military and diplomatic success, though miniature in scale, is a standing rebuke to the multilateral, post-national, Kantian utopianism that is the prevailing style of European Union diplomacy.

This ought to raise questions among the Europeans, whose "dialogue"-based foreign policy leaves them almost wholly defenseless against what Ana Palacio calls the politics of faits accomplis. What if next time Morocco, aiming its appeal to native nationalists, sends a much larger force, with heavy weaponry? Spain has answered that question in spades--it will fight, and it will prevail. But what if Morocco, aiming its appeal at the "European human rights community," decides to occupy Perejil with a gang of children throwing stones? That is Europe's question to answer--and the answer is shrouded in doubt.

Christopher Caldwell is a senior editor at The Weekly Standard.